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Abstract
This paper analyzes the development of the ratio of corporate taxes to wage
taxes using a simple political economy model with workers and capitalists that
own internationally mobile and immobile rms. Among other results, our model
predicts that countries reduce their corporate tax rate, relative to the wage tax,
when preferences for public goods increase, or when the share of capital employed
in multinational rms is rising. We further show how an increase in the wage share
changes both the relative size of tax bases and the political inuence of di¤erent
income groups. The predicted relationships are tested using panel data for 23
OECD countries for the period 1980 through 2004. The results of the empirical
analysis support our main hypotheses.
Keywords Capital and labor taxes, economic integration
JEL Classication H20  H73  F15  F23
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1 Introduction
A frequently raised concern in public policy is that increasing capital market integration
is eroding the traditional role of the tax system in equalizing the (after-tax) distribution
of income. These concerns are based on the di¤erential development of wage and capital
tax rates over the last decades. Data for the OECD countries show that in the early
1980s the statutory rate of the corporate income tax (CIT) was 50% higher, on average,
than the labor tax wedge for the average worker. By the year 2000, however, the two
tax rates had become roughly equal (see Table 1). Related evidence shows that, on
average, European Union (EU) member states have reduced their reliance on capital
taxes and increased the share of labor taxes in total tax revenues during the past
30 years (Eurostat 2005). These developments and the concern they cause underlie,
for example, several EU policy initiatives which aim at a coordinated increase in the
e¤ective taxation of capital income (European Commission 1997, 2001).
In the aggregate, the trends described above are in line with the results of the tax
competition literature, which predicts a reduction in the relative reliance on corporate
taxes as the optimal response to greater capital market integration (see Wilson 1999
for a survey). It is also evident from Table 1, however, that the tax policy changes have
been rather diverse, even among the relatively homogeneous group of OECD countries.
In several countries (e.g., Austria, Finland, Greece and Sweden) the ratio of statutory
CIT rates to labor taxes has fallen by more than 50% during the period 1980 through
2004, whereas the same ratio has stayed virtually constant in the United States and it
has even increased in Italy and Spain. The pattern is very similar when the corporate
tax burden is measured by e¤ective average tax rates, which also include changes in
the tax base.1
Table 1 also shows that most of the classical welfare states in Scandinavia and conti-
nental Europe now have lower ratios of corporate to wage taxes than the Anglo-Saxon
countries (except Ireland). For example, in 2004, the corporate tax rate was only 63%
of the wage tax rate for an average worker in Sweden, but 171% of the wage tax rate in
1While tax bases have been broadened in several countries since the 1980s, this change has been
far less pronounced, on average, than the reduction of statutory CIT rates. For a detailed account of
the development of corporate taxation in the OECD countries, see Devereux et al. (2002).
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Table 1: Taxation of corporate and labor income in the OECD
statutory e¤ective tax wedge tax ratio
CIT rate ()a CIT rateb on labor (t)c (=t)
Country 1980 2004 1980 2004 1980 2004 1980 2004
Australia 50.0 30.0 37.2 23.2  22.9  1.31
Austria 61.3 34.0 38.3d 22.5 29.9 36.8 2.05 0.92
Belgium 48.0 34.0 32.4d 24.4 41.6 44.9 1.15 0.76
Canada 44.8 35.6 26.7 25.9 18.3 27.6 2.45 1.29
Czech Republic  28.0  23.3  36.6  0.77
Denmark 40.0 30.0   36.9 35.7 1.08 0.86
Finland 60.2 29.0 42.7 21.1 37.4 40.3 1.61 0.72
France 50.0 35.4 34.0 24.8  43.2  0.82
Germany 62.2 38.3 44.9 28.6 36.1 41.5 1.72 0.92
Greece 43.4 35.0 32.2 22.4 17.4 34.9 2.49 1.00
Ireland 45.0 12.5 26.4 9.6 27.9 14.9 1.61 0.84
Italy 36.3 37.3 23.6 24.8 43.6 41.0 0.83 0.91
Japan 52.6 39.7 38.8 29.1 14.3 25.2 3.68 1.58
Luxembourg 45.5 30.4  20.0 29.1 20.6 1.56 1.48
Netherlands 48.0 34.5 35.3 25.2 43.8 38.9 1.09 0.89
New Zealand 45.0 33.0   20.0 20.7 2.25 1.82
Norway 50.8 28.0 35.9d 21.6 37.3 32.4 1.36 0.86
Poland  19.0  16.0  42.3  0.45
Portugal 55.1d 27.5 42.9d 18.9 27.0 27.5 1.91 1.00
Spain 33.0 35.0 24.0 24.5 34.6 34.8 0.95 1.01
Sweden 60.4 28.0 42.9d 19.5 46.7 44.6 1.29 0.63
United Kingdom 52.0 30.0 31.0 21.9 31.4 24.6 1.66 1.22
United States 49.6 39.3 31.5 25.5 29.4 23.0 1.69 1.71
OECD average 49.1 32.2 34.3 22.7 31.7 32.1 1.71 1.06
coe¤. of variation 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.28 0.40 0.29
a Including typical local income taxes and supplementary charges. In countries with more than one
tax rate, the manufacturing rate was chosen.
b E¤ective average tax rate for an investment in plant and machinery, nanced with 1/3 debt and
2/3 equity. Other assumptions: rate of economic prot: 20%; true economic depreciation: 12.25%; real
interest rate: 10%; ination: 3.5%. For details, see Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003).
c Average tax rate rate faced by a manufacturing employee on average income, assuming half of
employees are married. Includes personal income and payroll taxes, and social security contributions.
For details, see OECD (2006). The tax rates based on the old denition were chosen (as only for those
historical time series data are available).
d 1982
Sources: Corporate taxes: IFS tax data (www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210);
own calculations. Labor tax wedge: OECD (2006).
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the United States. Such di¤erences are in striking contrast to the common perception
that social democratic governments (as in Scandinavia and continental Europe) share a
higher preference for redistribution, as compared to more conservative and free market
oriented types of governments (Hibbs 1977).
Surprisingly, very little theoretical work has been devoted so far to explain the sub-
stantial and persistent cross-country di¤erences in the relative reliance on capital and
labor taxation. The only robust link that has been derived in the theoretical tax com-
petition literature is that small countries will face a more elastic capital tax base and
will therefore, on average, have a smaller capital tax rate than their larger neighbors
(Bucovetsky 1991; Wilson 1991). Even this result is not unambiguously found in the
data, however. While some small countries such as Ireland and Austria have indeed
strongly reduced their relative reliance on corporate taxation since the 1980s, so have
some large countries such as Germany or Japan. At the same time, other small coun-
tries like Luxembourg and New Zealand maintain ratios of corporate to wage taxation
that are signicantly above the OECD average.
These observations raise a number of interesting issues. Do the forces of globalization
and, in particular, capital mobility a¤ect countries in structurally di¤erent ways? Are
countries with large governments more prone to cut capital taxes? And do the relative
sizes of tax bases matter for the ratio of wage and prot taxes? Our aim in this paper
is to explore these questions from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
We begin by setting up a simple political economy model with two groups of voters,
workers and capitalists. The model takes into account some of the most pronounced
trends in the global economy such as the rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) and
the growing importance of multinational income in the tax base of developed countries
(Markusen 2002). We determine the e¤ects of a rising share of multinational income and
of increased preferences for public good supply on the mix of factor taxes. Moreover,
since capital owners may stand to gain more than wage earners from globalization, we
also analyze how a change in relative factor incomes and thus a shift in the balance of
powers in the political equilibrium can a¤ect relative tax rates. The model is stylized
on purpose, allowing us to derive sharp comparative static e¤ects.
In a second step we bring our model to the data. The distinguishing feature of our
empirical analysis is that it tests directly the hypotheses derived from our theoretical
3
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model, focusing on the e¤ect that several country-specic variables have on the ratio of
capital to labor taxation. This is done using a panel dataset from 23 OECD countries
for the period 1980 through 2004.
Our analysis yields three main results. First, our theoretical analysis shows that an
increase in government consumption leads to a more than proportional increase in
the wage tax and thus reduces the relative reliance on capital taxation. The empirical
analysis nds strong support for this hypothesis. This o¤ers an explanation for why
countries with a history of big governmentnevertheless rely relatively more on the
taxation of wages than their more market-oriented counterparts.
The second main prediction of our theoretical analysis is that an increasing share
of the income earned in multinational rms will, other things being equal, lower the
corporate income tax. The focus on multinational rms as an indicator for the exposure
of a country to the forces of globalization follows from the fact that multinational
rms are particularly apt at exploiting international tax di¤erentials through both real
investment decisions and cross-country prot shifting.2 Based on empirical evidence
that multinationals are more prevalent in manufacturing than in the service sector, we
proxy the share of multinationals in the economy by the ratio of value added in services
relative to manufacturing. This proxy proves to have a robust and signicant e¤ect on
the factor tax mix, supporting our theoretical expectation.
Third, our theoretical analysis yields ambiguous e¤ects for an increase in the wage share
on the composition of factor taxes: it increases the relative size of the labor tax base but
simultaneously increases the political inuence of workers. The empirical results show,
however, that a higher income share of workers has an unambiguously positive e¤ect
on the capital-labor tax ratio. This indicates that changes in the economic importance
of di¤erent interest groups may have signicant repercussions on their political power.
The paper also contributes to the literature which studies the relationship between
economic integration and capital taxation.3 This literature has yielded mixed ndings
so far. Studies that employ revenue-based measures of corporate taxation often nd a
positive relationship between integration and capital taxation, thus contradicting the
2See Devereux (2006) for a recent survey of the empirical evidence.
3A parallel strand of the literature focuses on the e¤ects of globalization on the size and composition
of public expenditures. See, e.g. Rodrik (1998) and Dreher et al. (2008).
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tax competition hypothesis (Quinn 1997; Swank and Steinmo 2002; Dreher 2006). In
contrast studies focusing on statutory or e¤ective average tax rates mostly estimate a
negative relationship that is consistent with the theory (Rodrik 1997; Bretschger and
Hettich 2002; Slemrod 2004). These divergent results seem to be driven by the fact
that corporate tax revenues as a share of GDP have risen in many countries, despite
the fall in statutory and e¤ective tax rates. Recent empirical research suggests that the
rise in corporate tax revenue is partly caused by a rising share of businesses choosing
incorporation, due to the fall in corporate tax rates relative to the personal income tax
(de Mooij and Nicodème 2008). Moreover corporate protability seems to have risen in
recent decades as a result of globalization itself (Becker and Fuest 2007). Based on this
evidence we argue that an analysis focusing on the actual tax choices of governments
should employ tax measures that are based on legal tax codes, rather than tax revenue.
Another critical issue in the relevant literature is the measurement of market integra-
tion, or country openness. Krogstrup (2004) nds no support for the tax competition
hypothesis if capital mobility is measured by (the absence of) capital account restric-
tions, or by parameters for the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI). The theory
is conrmed, however, when covered interest parity di¤erentials are used as an instru-
ment for the FDI stock. Similar results are obtained by Garretsen and Peeters (2007).
Winner (2005) uses a low savings-investment correlation as a proxy for capital market
openness, and nds a signicantly negative e¤ect on the rate of prot taxation. Finally,
Schwarz (2007) nds that capital mobility (measured as the absence of capital controls)
has a weakly negative e¤ect on the ratio of corporate to labor taxation. He also shows,
however, that country size and the share of investment expenditures are more impor-
tant determinants of the relative tax burden on capital. In this paper we propose a new
indicator for country opennesswhich is based on the share of multinational rms in
the economy.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model and
derives its comparative static e¤ects, which serve as hypotheses for the ensuing empiri-
cal analysis. The data and our empirical approach are described in Section 3. Section 4
presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 A simple political economy model of the capital-
labor tax ratio
2.1 The framework
In this section we develop a simple model of a small open economy that incorporates
several country-specic parameters and derives their e¤ects on the mix of capital and
labor taxes chosen in the political-economic equilibrium.4 Our analysis merges elements
from the political economy literature on factor taxation in open economies (e.g., Persson
and Tabellini 1992; Fuest and Huber 2001) and from the literature on the taxation of
multinational rms (e.g., Kind et al. 2005). At the same time we restrict our analysis
to the most basic e¤ects discussed in the tax competition literature (see Wilson 1999).
This allows us to derive reduced-form expressions for both tax rates and it greatly
facilitates our comparative static analysis. Despite its simplicity the model delivers
some results that have not been reported in the literature thus far.
We consider a country with two groups of consumers, capitalists and workers. Capital-
ists receive only capital income, whereas workers receive only wage income. The total
population is normalized to unity, and it is divided between  workers and (1   )
capitalists. Each capitalist owns a xed capital stock kd in a representative domestic
rm, and a capital stock km in a multinational enterprise (MNE). The total endowment
of each capitalist is thus denoted K  kd + km. Capital cannot be shifted between the
domestic and the multinational rm.
The representative capitalist in the small home country receives an exogenous, above-
normal return on each unit of capital, which is set equal to one. Capital income is taxed
by a proportional corporation tax levied at rate  . The multinational rm, but not the
domestic rm, can respond to the tax by relocating part of its capital between the
home country and a foreign country, where the foreign tax rate is exogenously given by
 . We focus here on the real e¤ects of capital relocation, implying that capital taxation
reduces the capital stock in the home country.5We denote the share of relocated capital,
4For a survey of the literature on the political economy of taxation, see Hettich and Winer (2004).
5Another well-known tax avoidance mechanism by multinational rms is the shifting of accounting
prots to low-tax countries. Empirically, there is strong evidence that both capital relocation and
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relative to the domestic capital stock of the MNE, by c. If c > 0 then some of the
domestic capital stock is moved abroad, whereas c < 0 implies a relocation of capital
from the foreign to the domestic country. In either direction the relocation of capital is
costly for the MNE. The costs are a convex (for simplicity, quadratic) function of the
share of relocated capital and are given by Fc = ckm(c)
2=2, where c is a net-of-tax
cost parameter. The after-tax income of the capitalist, indexed by subscript c, is then
Ic = [kd + (1  c) km] (1  ) + ckm (1  ) 
ckm(c)
2
2
; (1)
where the rst two terms are the after-tax incomes in the home and the foreign country,
respectively, and the last term gives the (net-of-tax) cost of relocating operations.
The owners of the MNE maximize (1) with respect to the relocation parameter c. This
yields c = (   ) =c so that c > 0 if the home countrys corporation tax exceeds
the exogenously given foreign tax rate  , and c < 0 if the tax di¤erential points in
the opposite direction. Incorporating this prot-maximizing behavior and introducing
km = sK to describe the multinational sectors share of the total capital stock, the
maximized after-tax income of each capitalist is
Ic =

1   + s(   )
2
2c

: (2)
The aggregate domestic capital stock, denoted , is determined by the optimizing
decision of capitalists and by the share of capitalists in the economy (1  ). Hence
 = (1  )[kd + (1  c)km] = (1  ) : K

1  s(   )
c

: (3)
Turning to the representative worker, her gross wage depends on the amount of capital
operating in the home country. For simplicity, we assume that the gross wage is a
linear function of the total capital stock employed domestically (by national and by
multinational rms).6 Let 0 <  < 1 be the proportionality factor with which the
prot shifting occur simultaneously in response to international tax di¤erentials (see Hines 1999).
6This implies that the marginal product of capital is constant. In a static model like the one used
here this assumption is clearly an oversimplication. In the longer run, however, it is often argued that
the size of the domestic capital stock also exerts positive e¤ects on R&D activity as well as on human
capital formation. If these e¤ects are taken into account then the marginal productivity of capital may
indeed be constant, as in the linear benchmark model of endogenous growth (often referred to as the
AK model; see Romer 2006: chap. 3). In this case the wage rate is also independent of labor supply
conditions, as in eq. (4).
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domestic capital stock a¤ects the gross wage. Then
! =   = (1  )K

1  s (   )
c

: (4)
The dependence of the wage rate on the domestic capital stock gives workers an in-
centive to choose a mix of wage and prot taxes, rather than rely exclusively on prot
taxation.
The second tax in the model is a linear tax on wages, levied at rate t. Workers can
avoid the wage tax by working in the shadow economy thereby creating a deadweight
welfare loss. We formulate the tax avoidance decision of workers in an analogous way
as that for multinational rms and denote by w the share of work income relocated
to the shadow economy. The deadweight cost of this reallocation is Fw = w!(w)
2=2.
The net income of a representative worker (subscript w) is then, using (4)
Iw = (1  )K

1  s (   )
c
 
1  t(1  w) 
w(w)
2
2

:
Maximization with respect to w gives w = t=w. Substituting this into the expression
for Iw yields the maximized after-tax income of each worker as
Iw = (1  )K

1  s (   )
c
 
1  t

1  t
2w

: (5)
The share of capital income earned domestically forms the base of the corporation tax,
whereas the labor tax falls on all wage income that is legally earned. Recalling that
there are  workers and 1   capitalists in the economy, total tax revenue is given by
T = (1  )K

1  s (   )
c
 
 + t

1  t
w

: (6)
Each income group derives utility from its maximized after-tax income (Ic and I

w,
respectively) and a public good. The marginal benet of the public good, , is assumed
to be constant and equal for both income groups. It exceeds the private marginal utility
of income (which is normalized to unity), thus introducing a motive for taxation.7 With
7The condition  > 1 can be seen as a short-cut way of incorporating scale economies in the
provision of public goods. The assumption of a constant marginal utility from public good supply is
made to simplify the analysis, but it should not bias our results for the optimal mix of capital and
labor taxes in any particular direction. Note also that nite optimal tax rates are obtained in our
model, despite the linearity of the objective function in both private income and public goods. This
is because the excess burden of taxation is strictly convex in each of the two tax rates.
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these specications, the utility function of capitalists (c) and workers (w) has the form
Ug = I

g + T; g 2 fc; wg: (7)
We rst determine the optimal tax mix from the perspective of capitalists. Using (2)
and (6) in (7) and maximizing with respect to the optimal labor tax rate gives
tc =
w
2
; (8)
where a subscript c indicates that this is the optimal labor tax from the perspective of
capitalists. Note that (8) is simply the revenue-maximizing tax rate on labor income.
Di¤erentiating the capitalistsutility function with respect to the capital tax yields
@Uc
@
= [(1  )  1] : K

1  s (   )
c

  (1  )K s
c

 + t

1  t
w

:
The second term on the RHS is unambiguously negative, whereas the rst term has
the same sign as [(1   )   1]. If workers form the majority of the population and,
hence, 1   is small, then this expression will also be negative for moderate levels of
. Excluding negative tax rates, capitalists will then favor a capital tax of
 c = 0: (9)
Hence the preferred tax policy of capitalists is straightforward. They prefer a zero tax
on their own income source but the revenue-maximizing tax rate on wage income.
To derive the optimal tax policy for workers, substituting (5) and (6) in (7) gives
Uw = (1  )K

1  s (   )
c



1  t

1  t
2w

+ 

 + t

1  t
w

:
In a rst step the optimal wage tax from the perspective of workers is then derived as
tw =
w(  1)
(2  1) : (10)
The workerspreferred wage tax is thus linearly rising in the cost parameter w. It will
be positive if the marginal benet from this tax,  (the value of one unit of the public
good, times the share of workers on whom the tax is imposed), exceeds the marginal
cost of unity. In the following we assume that this condition is met and tw > 0.
In a second step the optimal corporation tax rate is derived using (10). This yields
 w =
c
2s
+

2
  
2

1 +
w(  1)2
2(2  1)

: (11)
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The workerspreferred capital tax (11) consists of three parts. The two rst terms are
positive and describe the benets, from the perspective of workers, of taxing capital
income. These terms will be large when the share of the mobile, multinational tax base
s is low, when it is costly for the MNE to relocate capital (c is large), or when the
exogenous foreign tax rate  is high. The third, negative term describes the incentive
for workers to subsidize domestic capital, in order to raise gross wages. This incentive
is rising in . The capital tax will be positive if  is moderate so that, in the valuation
of workers, the revenue gains from the taxation of capital income exceed the induced
reduction in gross wages. This is assumed in what follows. Workers will then prefer a
mix of wage and prot taxes, due to the dependence of their gross wage on the domestic
capital stock.
Finally we have to characterize the overall tax mix in the political-economic equilib-
rium. To keep our analysis as simple as possible we assume that the resulting equilib-
rium taxes are weighted averages of the tax rates desired by capitalists and workers,
respectively, where the weights are determined by the share of the respective income
group in the overall population.8 Specically we assume that the equilibrium tax rates
on wages and prots are determined as
t = "tw + (1  ")tc ;   = " w + (1  ") c ; (12)
where the parameter " > 0 measures how strongly a change in the share of workers
a¤ects the political inuence of this income group and hence the equilibrium tax mix.
2.2 Determinants of the equilibrium tax mix
We now derive the comparative static e¤ects of changes in the exogenous parameters on
the mix of wage and capital taxes in the political-economic equilibrium. In this analysis
it is generally su¢ cient to consider the e¤ects of exogenous parameter changes on the
tax mix desired by the representative worker [eqs. (10)(11)], as the tax rates favored
by capitalists [eqs. (8)(9)] are una¤ected by most model parameters. Accordingly
8This specication can be interpreted as the simplest form of a political support function where the
votes of capitalists and workers are perfect substitutes. See Hotte and Winer (2001) for an application
of the political support function to explain changes in the capital-labor tax ratio in the United States
during the period 1973-1983.
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the weighting scheme (12) plays no role in the comparative static analysis, except for
changes in the composition of the population ().
A rst and straightforward exercise is to determine the e¤ects of an increase in the
foreign (world) tax rate  . This unambiguously increases the relative reliance on the
corporation tax desired by voters and has no e¤ect on the desired tax mix of capitalists.
Hence in equilibrium the ratio of corporate to labor taxes rises unambiguously
@( =t)
@
=
"
2t
> 0: (13)
Next, we consider the e¤ects of market integration. Proceeding as before, an increase
in the relocation cost parameter c changes the equilibrium tax mix by
@( =t)
@c
= "

2st
> 0: (14)
The e¤ects of lower shifting costs make the aggregate capital tax base more elastic and
reduce the equilibrium tax on this base. Since the wage tax is not a¤ected, economic
integration also reduces the relative reliance on prot taxes.9
Changes in either the world (average) tax rate or the degree of capital market in-
tegration will a¤ect all countries in similar ways. The latter holds at least for the
OECD countries, which lifted all remaining capital controls in the early 1990s and
where further capital market integration reects general improvements in information
technologies. Our model shows, however, that changing the country-specic share of
capital in the multinational sector gives similar predictions as increased capital market
integration. Raising s while holding the total capital stock constant yields
@( =t)
@s
=  
"c
s2t
< 0: (15)
A higher proportion of internationally mobile capital raises the average elasticity of the
corporate tax base, even when c is held constant. In equilibrium this lowers the tax
rate on capital, relative to the wage tax.
A well-known result is that small countries levy lower capital tax rates than their larger
neighbors (Bucovetsky 1991; Wilson 1991). We can relate our result in eq. (15) above to
9This comparative static e¤ect has been frequently analyzed in the tax competition literature. See
e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1992) or Kind et al. (2005).
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this literature, if we assume that the share of the multinational sector is larger in small
countries. One reason for this could be that the motive to engage in (market-seeking)
FDI becomes more important when the rms home market is small. We will examine
this relationship in our empirical analysis below.
A further important determinant are the (workers) preferences for public goods, as
captured by the parameter . This a¤ects equilibrium taxes in our model by
@t
@
=
"w
(2  1)2 > 0;
@ 
@
=
" [2(2  1)2   w(  1)(3  1)]
42(2  1)2 ? 0: (16)
A stronger preference for the public good will unambiguously raise the wage tax, but
the same need not be true for the capital tax. The reason for the latter result is that
an increase in  raises revenues from the corporation tax but, through the negative
e¤ect on wages, simultaneously reduces labor tax revenues. If the cost of working in
the shadow economy (w) is su¢ ciently large, implying  realistically  that most
tax revenues are raised from wage taxes, the negative repercussions of a capital tax
increase on wage tax collections will be strong. Intuitively, in this case the excess burden
associated with corporate taxation rises more steeply than the excess burden of wage
taxation. Hence a higher tax revenue requirement will be predominantly met by higher
wage taxes, whereas the corporation tax remains largely una¤ected or may even fall. To
our knowledge this relationship has not yet been identied in the existing literature.10
Finally, we consider the e¤ect of changing the share of workers .11 This a¤ects the
desired tax mix of the representative worker by
@tw
@
=
w
(2  1)2 > 0 ;
@ w
@
=  w(  1)
2(2  1)2 < 0 : (17)
The comparative static e¤ects in (17) are driven by isolated changes in the size of tax
bases. A rise in  increases the base of the wage tax while decreasing the base of the
capital tax. Other things equal, this will make it more attractive to tax wage income,
rather than corporate income.
10A related argument has been verbally made, however, by Apolte (2001). In his analysis an increase
in the size of the government budget is caused by a more wasteful (Leviathan) government, rather
than by higher preferences for the public good.
11See Becker (1983) for a pioneering analysis of how a change in the number of persons in di¤erent
pressure groups a¤ects the political equilibrium.
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At the same time, however, changing the composition of the population will also a¤ect
the political power of di¤erent income groups. Di¤erentiating the tax rates in the
political-economic equilibrium (12) with respect to , using @tc=@ = @

c=@ = 0 and
signing the e¤ects using (8)(11) and (17) yields
@t
@
= " 1
26664@tw@| {z }
(+)
+ "(tw   tc)| {z }
( )
37775 ? 0; @ @ = " 1
26664@ w@| {z }
( )
+ "( w    c)| {z }
(+)
37775 ? 0 :
(18)
A rise in the share of workers has two o¤setting e¤ects in our analysis. On the one
hand, it changes the sizes of tax bases. As discussed above, this tax base e¤ecttends
to increase the wage tax and reduce the capital tax. These are the rst terms in the
two square brackets in (18). On the other hand, the political impact of workers rises
vis-à-vis that of capitalists. This is reected in the second terms of the tax expressions.
As workers desire a lower level of wage taxation, but a higher level of capital taxation,
this political e¤ectcounteracts the tax base e¤ect. The political e¤ect will dominate
if the change in the political power of income groups, as measured by ", is su¢ ciently
strong. We summarize our theoretical results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The following changes in exogenous parameters reduce the rate of
the corporation tax, relative to the rate of wage taxation:
(a) an increase in the preference for public goods (), if the costs of shifting domestic
income to the shadow economy is su¢ ciently high;
(b) a fall in the share of wage income (), if the e¤ects of a changed composition of
income on the political power of di¤erent income groups are su¢ ciently strong.
(c) a fall in the costs of moving corporate activities abroad (c);
(d) a higher share of capital income earned by multinational rms (s);
(e) a lower world average tax rate ().
3 Data and empirical approach
The stylized model described above has allowed us to derive rigorously a number of
comparative static e¤ects, which represent theoretical hypotheses on country-specic
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determinants for the optimal mix of wage and prot taxation. In this section we discuss
our empirical model, which aims to test these predictions with available data.
The data requirements for our analysis, which tests a relatively wide range of predic-
tions, are substantial. Therefore we focus on a panel of 23 OECD countries, given in
Table 1, for which the relevant data can be obtained. Our analysis covers the time
period from 1980 to 2004. This period was characterized by the removal of the remain-
ing capital market controls among the developed countries, and by a rapid growth of
foreign direct investment and MNE activity (see Markusen 2002: ch. 1).
In constructing the data set for the empirical analysis, a rst and important choice that
needs to be made is how to measure tax rates. For convenience, implicit tax rates are
often computed, where tax revenues from a given source are divided by the correspond-
ing tax base obtained from national accounts statistics. The advantage is that such data
are widely available, and that they include the e¤ects of all aspects of complicated tax
systems. For corporate income however, they also have important drawbacks. As doc-
umented in Devereux and Klemm (2004), the movement over time of revenue-based
tax measures can have little in common with changes in tax laws. Instead they are
mainly driven by the business cycle, historical e¤ects, such as accumulated losses, and
many other factors that are impossible to control for econometrically. Moreover, there
is empirical evidence that falling corporate tax rates have caused an increased number
of businesses to choose incorporation, raising corporate tax revenue at the expense of
personal income taxes (de Mooij and Nicodème 2008). This implies that revenue-based
measures of capital taxation that focus solely on corporate tax receipts will yield biased
results.12 For these reasons we use tax measures that are exclusively based on tax laws.
In particular, we use the statutory tax rate, carefully adding any sub-federal taxes or
averages thereof as well as any supplementary charges. We also test the robustness of
our results when e¤ective average tax rates are used instead and the e¤ect of tax laws
on the corporate tax base are thus included in the dependent variable.
A symmetric treatment of wage taxes would imply using the top marginal income tax
12These expectations are conrmed by the empirical results of Slemrod (2004), who tests alterna-
tive specications using either statutory corporate tax rates or a corporate tax measure based on
collected revenue. Slemrods regressions for the revenue-based measure mostly yield coe¢ cients that
are insignicant, or of unexpected sign.
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rate. This approach has, however, one important disadvantage: in the early 1980s top
rates were extremely high in a number of countries. As the income threshold for such
rates was also high, they were irrelevant for the large majority of the population, except
for a few high income earners. What is needed instead is a typical tax rate faced by
an average worker, as provided by the OECD (2006). This measure gives the tax rate
faced by a manufacturing worker on the mean salary, and includes social security and
payroll taxes.13
Turning to the explanatory variables, we proxy the preference for public goods () by
government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP.14 For the share of workers
in the economy () we use wages and salaries divided by GDP. This measure is used
because it is likely to proxy not only for the quantity of workers, but also for their
quality. The rest-of-the-world (ROW) average tax rate () is based on a large sample
of corporate tax rates in 70 countries. For each country in the regression, we calculate
the inverse distance-weighted average of all other countries in this sample. Details on
the denition and the sources of these data are given in the appendix (Table A.1).
A core variable in previous empirical studies has been the cost of international capi-
tal relocation (c), or the opennessof the economy. Several studies have employed a
qualitative index of capital market restrictions, as developed in Quinn (1997); see, for
example, Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Krogstrup (2004) and Schwarz (2007). For
the OECD countries in our sample the Quinn measure exhibits little variation since
the early 1990s, however, as capital markets have been almost completely liberalized
throughout this period. Moreover, measures of capital market restrictions relate pri-
13We do not include consumption taxes into our wage tax measure, for two reasons. First, a dif-
ferentiated rate structures and exemptions make it di¢ cult to incorporate commodity taxes into an
approach that is based solely on tax laws. Second, and more importantly, commodity taxes exclude the
normal return to capital from tax, but they do fall on pure prots, along with wage income. Therefore
no unambiguous link between commodity and factor taxation can be established in a model with pure
prots, such as the one used here.
14Note that this measure does not include transfers, such as most social security expenditure.
Including the latter would bias our results towards a positive relationship between public expenditure
and labor taxes, as social security expenditures are nanced in many countries by wage-related social
security contributions. Moreover, government expenditures consist mainly of employeessalaries. Once
the initial hiring decision has been made, these expenditures are of a more long-run nature than
transfers and social security expenditure and hence are more likely to be exogenous.
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marily to the mobility of portfolio capital. When, as in our analysis, the focus lies on
the taxation of corporate prots, it is preferable to use a measure of openness that is
related to foreign direct investment (FDI). An important problem, however, is that all
measures of FDI (both stocks and ows) are endogenous to the choice of corporate tax
rates.15 In our model the size of the outward FDI stock depends on both the exogenous
share of capital in multinational rms (sK) and on the endogenous share of capital
that is moved abroad (). But this implies that the theoretically expected relationship
between the outward FDI stock (sK) and the domestic tax rate is fundamentally
ambiguous, because an exogenous increase in the potentially mobile, multinational tax
base puts downward pressure on capital taxes, and this in turn reduces the share of cap-
ital that ows abroad in equilibrium. Nevertheless we will consider both the FDI stock
and the Quinn measure of capital market restrictions as regressors in our empirical
analysis.
It follows from this discussion that a suitable, country-specic indicator of openness
should focus on the potential mobility of capital and thus include the entire capital
stock of mobile rms, rather than just the portion that is relocated abroad (the FDI
stock). This gure is not readily available, however. The approach taken in this paper
is to employ the industrial structure of the economy as a proxy for the share of the
multinational sector. Specically, we use the ratio of value added in the service sector
to value added in manufacturing as an indicator of a low share of MNE activity in the
economy. The use of this proxy is based on evidence collected by the OECD (2008)
for most of the countries covered in our analysis. Table 2 shows that the employment
share of a¢ liates of foreign-controlled companies in the sectors total is, on average,
less than half as large in the services sector as compared to manufacturing. Moreover
the relationship is a very stable one, as is shown by the fact that this ratio is below 0.5
for all but three of the 17 individual countries listed in the table.
There are two main reasons for why this robust link between the sectoral composition
of output and the importance of MNEs can be expected. First, a substantial part of
the tertiary sector are locally provided services, including retail trade, transport and
storage and community social services, which do not lend themselves to a multinational
15See our theoretical analysis where the domestic capital stock (), and hence also the FDI stock
abroad (1  )K   , depends on the international tax di¤erential [eq. (3)].
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Table 2: Employment in MNEs: Services and manufacturing (2005)
servicesa manufac- ratio
(1) turinga (2) (1):(2)
Australia 10.5 22.7 0.46
Austria 9.7 22.5 0.43
Belgium 14.2 33.1 0.43
Denmark 6.1 14.4 0.42
Finland 11.9 16.5 0.72
France 10.5 26.4 0.40
Germany 6.5 15.2 0.43
Ireland 22.3 48.0 0.46
Italy 6.1 12.4 0.49
Luxembourg 16.3 39.3 0.41
Netherlands 8.9 25.1 0.35
Norway 3.5 22.3 0.16
Portugal 4.7 12.6 0.37
Spain 9.5 15.6 0.61
Sweden 22.4 33.8 0.66
United Kingdom 12.0 27.6 0.43
United States 3.8 11.2 0.30
unweighted average 10.5 23.0 0.44
a employment of a¢ liates under foreign control, as a percentage of sector total.
2005 or latest available year.
Source: OECD (2008): OECD Factbook. www.sourceoecd.org/factbook - Economic globali-
sation - foreign direct investment (FDI) - activities of multinationals.
Table 3: Empirical implementation of the model
parameter in label in regression predicted
model analysis sign on =t
 ROW average corporate tax rate (+)
 public consumption/GDP ()
 wages/GDP (+, )
c capital controls index ()a
c  s FDI stock abroad/GDP (+, )
s service/manufacturing value-added (VA) (+)
GDP in US-$ trillion (+)
a A low value of the index indicates strict capital controls.
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organizational form. Second, MNEs are known to be particularly important in sectors
characterized by high levels of R&D and by high levels of product di¤erentiation (see
Markusen 2002: ch. 1). While these characteristics also apply to certain parts of the
service sector, they are more widespread, on average, in manufacturing.
To be sure, our proxy for the share of mobile rms in the economy is not without
problems. One issue is that the sectoral composition may itself be a¤ected by tax
policies. High corporate income tax rates may, for example, encourage capital-intensive
production, because capital expenditure qualies for depreciation allowances, which are
more valuable under high tax rates.16 However, the e¤ect of taxes on the economy-wide
production structure is arguably far less important than the e¤ect of taxes on FDI
stocks or ows. Moreover, by the above argument high taxes would favor the more
capital-intensive manufacturing sector and thus work in the opposite direction of the
postulated relationship. Hence if such feedback e¤ects of tax policy on the composition
of output are indeed present, the estimated coe¢ cient would be biased downwards.17
Finally, we include the level of GDP (measured in purchasing power parities) as a
measure of country size. This follows the results in the theoretical literature on capital
tax competition that smaller countries tend face a more elastic capital tax base, other
things being equal, and will thus have a lower ratio of corporate to wage taxes in
equilibrium. Table 3 summarizes how the predictions from our theoretical model are
tested empirically. Descriptive statistics on the variables employed in our analysis are
given in the appendix (Table A.2).
16Davis and Henrekson (1999) discuss this issue in the context of Sweden.
17Another issue is that the sectoral composition of output may change over the economic cycle.
There seems to be no literature addressing this question directly, but related studies suggest that this
e¤ect is not very pronounced. Jimeno (1992) argues that sectoral shocks have only limited aggregate
e¤ects. As he considers sectors at a more disaggregated level, this is consistent with assuming no
major changes in the relationship between service and manufacturing sectors. Similarly, Ghosh and
Wolf (1997) argue that geographical shocks are more important than sectoral shocks in explaining the
US aggregate economic climate. In any event, time e¤ects will allow for any common cyclical e¤ects
in our regression analysis.
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4 Results
To explore the relationship between the ratio of corporate to labor taxes in individual
countries and the exogenous parameters described above, we use standard panel data
methods. Specically we run (OLS) regressions of the form
(=t)it = Xit + i + t + "it :;
where (=t)it is the tax ratio in country i at time t, Xit is the vector of our explanatory
variables, i and t are xed country and time e¤ects and "it is an error term.
An important feature of our empirical analysis is that we incorporate country xed ef-
fects in all regressions. This procedure follows from a rigorous interpretation of our the-
oretical comparative static results: they derive hypotheses on how the tax mix adjusts
within a given country when one of the exogenous variables changes. A cross-country
interpretation of these e¤ects would be permitted only if our model incorporated all
variables that explain di¤erences in the tax mix between countries. Clearly, this cannot
be claimed for our simple model. The same point can also be stated econometrically.
Since it is likely that we have omitted important variables, a regression that does not use
xed country e¤ects will yield biased estimates, if the omitted variables are correlated
in some way with the variables that are included in our regression. These expectations
are conrmed by standard F- and Hausman tests, which suggest that xed country
e¤ects should be used in our analysis.18 The estimates derived from our specication
with country xed e¤ects will then be unbiased, if the unobserved variables do not
change over time.
The results from our main set of regressions are presented in Table 4.19 In the nal
column, where we include the rest-of-the-world average corporate tax rate, we ex-
18F-tests on the xed e¤ect versus pooled model reject the pooled model for all regressions in Table 4
at the one percent level of signicance. Hausman tests on the xed versus random e¤ect model reject
the random e¤ects model for regressions (4) and (5) in Table 4. Where Hausman tests cannot reject
the random e¤ect model, we have also obtained results under that model. These proved to be very
similar, except that in regression (3) the coe¢ cient on the FDI stock abroad is reduced to 0.011, but
turns signicant with a p-value of 2%.
19Constants are not shown in Table 4, because they are arbitrary in the presence of year e¤ects,
which are implemented as dummy variables.
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Table 4: Estimation results - Baseline case
dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
variable corporate income tax /wage tax (=t)
country e¤ects
p p p p p
year e¤ects
p p p p

public consump- -6.526 -7.342 -4.788 -9.586 -9.640
tion/GDP (1.583) (1.611) (1.855) (1.689) (1.572)
wages/GDP 2.568 2.941 3.446 2.501 2.265
(0.977) (1.038) (1.113) (0.850) (0.817)
GDP in US-$ 0.013 0.036 0.039 -0.033 -0.038
trillion (0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
capital controls 0.096
index (0.036)
FDI stock 0.018
abroad/GDP (0.014)
service/manu- 0.394 0.402
facturing VA (0.053) (0.052)
ROW average 2.086
corporate tax rate (1.014)
time trend -0.036
(0.007)
observations 470 302 382 351 339
Hausman statistic 0.2 1.0 0.6 67.6 79.5
R-squaredy 0.86 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.90
R-squaredz 0.34 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.58
Notes: Robust (Huber/White) standard errors in parentheses.
Stars indicate level of signicance (: 10%; : 5%; : 1%).
y: including time and country e¤ects (where they are in the regression)
z: excluding time and country e¤ects
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clude time e¤ects. Otherwise we would estimate the trivial relationship between each
countrys own tax rate and the rest-of-the-world average, as within a year, the rest-of-
the-world average tax rate will be lowest for the country with the highest tax rate and
vice versa.
Column (1) of Table 4 relates the dependent variable to parameters of the domestic
economy only. A rst main result of our analysis is that the coe¢ cient of the public
consumption variable has the expected negative sign and is highly signicant. To our
knowledge this relationship has not been tested in the previous literature.20 Moreover,
this result is very robust across the di¤erent regressions. This provides evidence that
an increase in government consumption changes the tax mix in the direction of a
higher share of wage taxation, as predicted in Proposition 1(a). The relationship is
also important in size, indicating that an increase in the government consumption share
of GDP by one percentage point will reduce the ratio of tax rates by 6-9 percentage
points. Recall, nally, that transfers and social security expenditures are not included in
our measure of public consumption (cf. footnote 14). Hence the result does not derive
from an increase in social security expenditures that are nanced by wage-related
contributions.
The coe¢ cient of the wage share variable is positive and it is also highly signicant.
Recall from our theoretical discussion in section 2 that a pure optimal taxation per-
spective would instead predict a negative coe¢ cient of the wage share variable, as it is
more e¢ cient to tax the relatively larger tax base. Hence our empirical analysis indi-
cates that the tax base e¤ect is dominated by political e¤ects. Changes in the economic
importance of di¤erent income groups therefore seem to have important repercussions
on the political power of these groups, as stated in Proposition 1(b).21
20The public consumption variable is incorporated by Slemrod (2004, Table 2), where it is found to
be insignicant. However, Slemrods study focuses only on the isolated determinants of the corporation
tax and does not address the question of how increased public consumption a¤ects a countrys mix of
wage and prot taxation. Schwarz (2007, Table 4) nds that a dummy for left-wing governments has
a surprising, negative e¤ect on the capital-labor tax ratio. He links this to the size of the welfare state
but does not incorporate a public consumption variable in his empirical specication.
21Empirical support for an isolated tax base e¤ect is found in a recent study by Kenny and Winer
(2006). Their analysis simultaneously incorporates a number of political variables, thus controlling
for simultaneous changes in the political equilibrium. Moreover, their analysis is based on a far larger
21
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In contrast, the coe¢ cient of the GDP variable is not signicant in the regression of
column (1) and it shows high volatility across the di¤erent regressions. Overall, the
results therefore indicate that changes in the relative sizes of economies do not appear
to exert an independent positive e¤ect on the ratio of corporate to wage taxation. This
is most likely explained by the fact that the relative sizes of economies do not change
much during the observation period, and any permanent size e¤ects are taken up by
the country xed e¤ects.
The regressions in columns (2) and (3) add the two main proxies for capital market
integration that have been used in the previous literature. Column (2) includes Quinns
(1997) measure of capital controls. This measure is statistically signicant, but re-
calling that an increase in the index represents an opening of capital markets  the
coe¢ cient has the wrong sign. This seemingly contradicts the earlier result of Rodrik
(1997), who found that a liberalization of international capital controls reduces the
corporate tax rate. The apparent discrepancy is resolved by noting that our specica-
tion in column (2) uses country xed e¤ects. When these are eliminated the sign of the
capital control variable is reversed and now matches the theoretical expectations and
previous ndings. These results indicate that Proposition 1(c) is conrmed only from a
cross-country perspective, but the capital control variable is not well suited to predict
country-specic changes in the ratio of corporate to wage taxation over time.22
Column (3) shows that the coe¢ cient of the outward FDI stock is insignicant. This
result should not be surprising, given that our theoretical analysis has derived a fun-
damentally ambiguous relationship between the FDI stock and the corporate tax rate.
Furthermore, the FDI variable remains insignicant if the inward FDI stock is used
instead, or if the endogeneity of the FDI stock is accounted for by an instrumental
sample of 100 countries (but covers only three time periods). The inclusion of many less developed
countries may be an independent reason for the di¤erences between their results and ours.
22Results that are similar to ours are obtained in the analysis of Bretschger and Hettich (2002,
Table 2). They nd that the capital controls variable is statistically signicant in a cross-country
analysis without xed country e¤ects, but loses its signicance when country dummies are added.
Alternatively, Winner (2005) uses savings-investment correlations as a proxy for capital market open-
ness. His analysis shows that this measure of openness has a robust, negative e¤ect on the ratio of
capital to labor taxation, even when country xed e¤ects are added.
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variable (IV) approach.23
Column (4) employs the ratio of service to manufacturing value added as an (inverse)
proxy for the share of capital located in internationally mobile rms. This variable has
the expected sign, as an increase in the share of relatively immobile capital in the service
sector increases the relative reliance on prot taxation. Moreover, the relationship
is found to be so highly signicant (with t-values in the range of 7-8) that it can
be expected to survive in many alternative model specications. Taking into account
that the ratio of service to manufacturing value-added increased on average by eight
percentage points per year,24 the coe¢ cient is also economically signicant and implies,
other things equal, an increase in the tax ratio of about three percentage points per
year. Proposition 1(d) of our theoretical model is thus strongly conrmed by the data.
Lastly, column (5) includes the rest-of-the-world average corporate tax rate as an ex-
planatory variable. As discussed above this analysis cannot employ year e¤ects, but we
add a time trend to the regression analysis. In this specication both the time trend
and the world tax rate are signicant, suggesting the presence of both a general trend
over time towards lower tax rates, and a dependence on neighboring countries tax
rates.25 Proposition 1(e) is thus also conrmed by the data.
We now turn to evaluating the sensitivity of our results. The estimates in Table 4
measure the tax burden on prots by the statutory corporate income tax rate. The
core relationships identied in our analysis are, however, identical in sign and similar
23See our working paper version (Hauer et al. 2006). This paper instruments the FDI stock using
Quinns measure of capital controls. As we have discussed in section 3, however, the limited variability
over time of this measure reduces its empirical usefulness. Since it is possible that the insignicance of
the FDI stock variable is caused by the limitations of the instrument, the results of this regression are
not shown here. Krogstrup (2004) and Garretsen and Peeters (2007) show, however, that FDI stocks
and ows can be used as proxies for capital market integration when they are properly instrumented
and when an agglomeration variable is simultaneously incorporated in the estimation.
24This increase of roughly eight percentage points is caused by the relatively high ratio of service
to manufacturing value added (equal to four, on average; see Table A.2). This represents an increase
of on average just 0.4 percentage points in the ratio of value added in services over the sum of value
added in services and manufacturing.
25Note that spatial autocorrelation is addressed in our estimation by using an inverse distance-
weighted average. Moreover, while the world tax rate is not fully exogenous, endogeneity is reduced
by basing the average tax rate on a large worldwide sample of 70 countries.
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: Baltagi and Wu (1999) method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dependent variable corporate income tax /wage tax (=t)
country e¤ects
p p p p p
year e¤ects
p p p p

public consump- -1.637 -4.621 -0.930 -5.419 -5.409
tion/GDP (1.296) (1.748) (1.287) (1.594) (1.478)
wages/GDP 1.775 2.672 1.421 2.669 2.644
(0.885) (1.241) (0.907) (1.027) (0.982)
GDP in US$ 0.056 0.006 0.118 0.041 -0.048
trillion (0.057) (0.067) (0.060) (0.053) (0.055)
capital controls -0.010
index (0.043)
FDI stock -0.006
abroad/GDP (0.041)
service/manu- 0.238 0.212
facturing VA (0.049) (0.049)
ROW average 3.207
corporate tax rate (0.789)
observations 447 285 360 330 318
LBI statistic 0.51 0.80 0.42 0.69 0.74
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Stars indicate level of signicance (: 10%; : 5%; : 1%).
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in magnitude when e¤ective average tax rates are used instead.26 This is shown in
Table A.3 in the appendix. In particular, the share of public consumption, the wage
share and the value-added shares of di¤erent sectors all remain highly signicant in
explaining the mix of prot to wage taxation, when the measurement of the corporate
tax variable includes legal changes in the tax base.27
Finally, the results presented in Table 4 all report heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors. It is however possible that the disturbances are also autocorrelated. To deal
with this we reran the regression allowing for clustered standard errors. The results
generally were robust to this change, except that the coe¢ cient of the wage share
turned insignicant in most regressions, as did the coe¢ cient on the rest-of-the-world
corporate tax rate. In small and unbalanced samples this correction to standard errors
may, however, be biased. We therefore also employ the method developed by Baltagi
and Wu (1999) to test and allow for AR(1) autocorrelated disturbances in our panel
dataset. Table 5 reports the results from this sensitivity analysis. The results suggest
that some autocorrelation is indeed likely to be present in our data, as is seen from low
locally best invariant test (LBI) statistics. However, the results presented in Table 5
also show that our main ndings are robust to allowing for autocorrelated disturbances,
at least when the service share variable is included, as in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5.
In these specications the wage share variable is also once again signicant at the 1%
level.
5 Summary and conclusion
This paper has started from the observation that there are substantial and persistent
di¤erences in the ways OECD countries have adjusted their relative reliance on cor-
26The e¤ective average tax rate, developed by Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003), is equivalent to a
weighted average of the e¤ective marginal tax rate on an investment that just earns a net rate of
return equal to the going interest rate, and the statutory tax rate. The weight of the statutory tax
rate in this measure rises with the (assumed) protability of the underlying investment project.
27The only qualitative di¤erence in results is that the coe¢ cient of the rest-of-the-world tax rate is
insignicant in Table A.3. This is probably explained by the inconsistency between dependent variable,
which is based on e¤ective tax rates, and the explanatory variable, which, for lack of data, is still based
on statutory tax rates.
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porate and wage taxation to the forces of globalization. For this purpose we have set
up a simple model that allows us to derive rigorously a number of testable hypotheses
relating the mix of corporate and wage taxation to several country-specic variables.
In a second step, we have tested the theoretical predictions using data from 23 OECD
countries for the period 19802004.
Our theoretical and empirical analysis has isolated three important country-specic
variables that shape the mix of prot and wage taxation in the OECD. First our
theoretical analysis has shown that an increase in government consumption will lead
to a more than proportional increase in the wage tax. The reasoning behind this result
is that the excess burden of the capital tax rises more steeply than that of the wage
tax, because the capital tax reduces not only the domestic capital stock but also wage
income. Our empirical tests provide support for this hypothesis. Other things being
equal, a rising share of government consumption in GDP will cause a country to increase
its reliance on wage taxes, relative to the tax on corporate prots. This o¤ers an
explanation for why countries with a history of big governmentand long periods of
social democratic rule nevertheless rely relatively more on the taxation of wages than
their more market-oriented counterparts. From a policy reform perspective, this result
implies that reducing government consumption is a highly e¤ective way of reducing the
tax burden on the average wage earner.
The second main prediction of our theoretical analysis is that an increasing share of the
income earned in multinational rms will, other things being equal, lower the corporate
income tax. Based on empirical evidence that multinationals are more prevalent in man-
ufacturing as opposed to the service sector, we have proxied the share of multinationals
in the economy by the ratio of value added in services relative to manufacturing. This
proxy proved to have a robust and signicant e¤ect on the factor tax mix. Moreover,
it outperforms traditional measures of openness, such as the index of capital account
restrictions, when country xed e¤ects are included in the regression analysis and the
focus is thus on explaining the tax changes that occurred within a given country over
time.
Third, and nally, our theoretical analysis has shown that an increase in the wage share
simultaneously changes the relative size of tax bases, but also the political inuence
of di¤erent income groups. From a pure e¢ ciency (or optimal tax) perspective only
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the rst e¤ect should matter and the reliance on wage taxation should increase. Our
empirical analysis yields the opposite result, however, indicating that changes in the
economic importance of di¤erent groups have important repercussions on their political
power and hence on the political economic equilibrium. These e¤ects clearly deserve
further analysis in future work on the determinants of the structure of factor taxation.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Data sources and methods
Variable Source Denition and methodology
Corporate Institute for Fiscal Statutory tax plus typical local taxes and other
income tax Studies; World Tax surtaxes. Where multiple rates are available, the
rate Database (Michigan) manufacturing rate is chosen.
Wage tax OECD Taxing Average tax wedge of manufacturing worker on
rate Wages average income. This includes personal income
taxes, employer and employee social security
contributions and payroll taxes.
public con- OECD National Public consumption expenditure divided by GDP
sumption/GDP Accounts
wages/GDP OECD Nat. Accounts, Gross wage bill divided by GDP
OECD Econ. Outlook, (excluding income of self-employed and
OECD Analyt. Database owner-managed rms)
GDP in US-$ OECD National GDP in trillion US$, converted at purchasing
trillion Accounts power parity exchange rates
capital Comparative Index ranging from 0 (closed capital markets) to
controls Welfare States 4 (open capital markets)
index Data Set
service/ OECD STAN Value added in the service sector divided by
manufacturing (Structural Ana- value added in the manufacturing sector
value-added lysis Database)
FDI stock IMF International Stock of foreign direct investment divided
abroad/GDP Financial Statistics by GDP
rest-of-the-world tax data from World Tax Inverse distance-weighted average statutory
average corporate DataBase (Michigan); corporate tax rate of 70 countries for which
tax rate distance data from CEPII continuous data are available from 1980-2004,
(Paris) excluding left-hand side country
Notes: - IFS data available from: www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210
- All OECD data available from: new.sourceoecd.org
- World tax data base available from: www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/introduction.htm
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- Distance data available from: www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
Full source: E. Huber, Ch. Ragin, J. D. Stephens, D. Brady, and J. Beckeld, Comparative
Welfare States Data Set, mimeo 2004. Original source of the measure: Quinn (1997).
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
variable obser- mean median standard min. max.
vations deviation
corporate tax/wage tax 509 1.258 1.155 0.548 0.272 3.745
public consumption/GDP 509 0.196 0.193 0.037 0.120 0.299
wages/GDP 470 0.420 0.423 0.057 0.225 0.536
GDP in US-$ trillion 509 0.813 0.205 1.592 0.005 11.657
capital controls index 308 3.471 3.500 0.588 2.000 4.000
FDI stock abroad 382 0.301 0.031 2.466 0.000 32.695
service/manufacturing VA 390 4.028 3.702 1.595 1.886 11.825
ROW average tax rate 451 0.355 0.341 0.041 0.285 0.441
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Table A.3. Sensitivity analysis: E¤ective average tax rates (EATR)
dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
variable EATR /wage tax
country e¤ects
p p p p p
year e¤ects
p p p p

public consump- -5.785 -5.341 -5.029 -7.632 -7.284
tion/GDP (1.198) (1.237) (1.303) (1.258) (1.172)
wages/GDP 1.695 1.741 3.325 1.921 1.532
(0.749) (0.741) (0.768) (0.584) (0.585)
GDP in US-$ 0.013 0.037 0.025 -0.014 -0.010
trillion (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
capital controls 0.0035
index (0.050)
FDI stock 0.097
abroad/GDP (0.058)
service/manu- 0.266 0.259
facturing VA (0.034) (0.032)
ROW average 0.077
corporate tax rate (0.762)
time trend -0.032
(0.006)
observations 389 260 334 300 289
R-squaredy 0.86 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.92
R-squaredz 0.34 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.59
Notes: Robust (Huber-White) standard errors in parentheses.
Stars indicate level of signicance (: 10%; : 5%; : 1%).
y: including time and country e¤ects (where they are in the regression)
z: excluding time and country e¤ects
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